Archive

Posts Tagged ‘Repos’

Dick Moore’s Industry and Finance Perspective

November 16th, 2011 2 comments

 

Dick Moore's Industry and Finance Perspective
 
Well, it seems that I struck a nerve with our friend up East. He mostly disappeared for a couple of years, quit writing his newsletter, and went dormant. I figured maybe his conscience was bothering him, after the spin he put on our industry.
 
Now I see a new post from our buddy in “Industry Voices,” the guest platform on Tony Kovach’s e-zine MHMSM NewsLine (MHMSM.com = MHProNews.com), wherein he goes on and on about me in a general mis-representation of my writings. I certainly never opinioned that he had powers akin to Superman. He did, however, invent some mystical losses derived by using losses from Brigadier, Conseco, and other lenders who did not know or understand how to buy MH paper. He then reported those loss figures to Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac, keeping them out of the (Manufactured Housing) markets.
 
This lack of competition had a negative impact on the other lenders that were still major players in our industry.
 
He admitted to me in Louisville one year that he was an “attorney” and was being “paid” by Fannie to advise them. He later denied all that, but everyone knows the credibility of lawyers and politicians. After all, who else gets “paid to have an opinion”?
 
My ex-neighbor was a college professor who taught business
administration at Memphis State University. After listening to his
many goofy ideas and theories, I realized the source of the old adage “If you can’t do it, teach it.” If you were a failure in the finance business, then go out and advise others how to do it!
 
The Mortgage Industry produced paper much worse than the MH
industry ever dreamed of, and that was the paper that our friend
advised Fannie to buy (instead of MH paper). Fannie’s losses are the worst losses the United States has ever endured, and it continues still. (How good was that advice?)
 
It is easy to measure or analyze a situation the way you
want it to look – just choose the measuring criteria needed
to give you the end result you want and ignore any thing
that doesn’t.
 
The MH Industry (its survivors) remains the only low-cost housing that is un-subsidized. Just because less qualified people enter the business and lose money from their poor business decisions does not equate to a ‘subsidy.’ Maybe our friend does not know or understand what a subsidy is. He sounds like Obama explaining the debt ceiling and how someone else created it.
 
I’m sure there will be another argumentative letter, but I have work to do and do not have the time to continue with fruitless exercises in writing.
 
********
 
This industry and its recourse lenders fared well and made good money from the 50’s to the 90’s, with no taxpayer subsidies.
 
This industry faces a number of problems, with the main one being lack of financing. The lenders and the learned professors of the industry like to blame the dealer for all the woes. True, we have had some bad apples in our business, just like every other industry. But the level of damage from that kind of dealer falls way short of the debacle we as an industry are paying for now.
 
One major issue our industry faces concerns resale values of our houses, which directly affects the lender’s recovery on defaulted loans. We as dealers have very little influence in that arena.
 
Many MH Communities will not accept houses over 10 years old; lenders will not finance homes over 10 years old. Somehow, when the house hits its 10th birthday, it suddenly is worth ZERO!?!?! And this is the dealer’s fault?!?!
 
When free enterprise existed in this country and banks lent money to their dealers with recourse, our industry performed well! Lenders were selective about who they would take on (based on the dealer’s financial condition and track record in the community), the dealers would take care of their funding pipeline by not sending them dead-beats (since the
dealer would have to repurchase if the loan fell out), and the dealers were paid endorsement fees for this guaranty. The dealers worked to re-sell the bank’s repos with good unpaid balances, and the paper overall performed quite well. It was that performance that led to the influx of the non-recourse lenders that we saw in the 90’s.
 
Long-gone lenders such as Bombardier, Conseco, Greenpoint Credit, BAHS, et al, saw the performance of recourse lenders’ portfolios, due to good resale values on houses sold under recourse agreements, and made the mental jump to they can do that too! Soon tactics such as withholding of proceeds and diverting rate spread and the odd-days’ interest into non-interest bearing reserve accounts became the norm from the lenders, at the expense of their MH dealer network.
 
In their headlong rush for gold, they also opened the funding gates to credit buyers who (like in today’s meltdown) had NO reason in their track records to get approved for loans at low rates and low down payments.
 
So, they kept the endorsement fees, put that rate spread into a reserve account for repossessions, and bought non-recourse.
 
Their inability to manage the repos, refurb and re-sell them (as the recourse lender/dealer relationships had done) created massive losses for them. Again, I fail to understand how this is the dealer’s fault.
 
********
 
President Obama is railing against corporate jets, while flying around on the most expensive jet in the world. The tax deductions on all the corporate jets in the US would not pay for Air Force One. Is this leading by example or “Do as I say, not as I do?”
 
Good leaders lead by example. They don’t accept favors from lobbyists and major contributors to their re-election campaigns, and they don’t spend the taxpayers’ money recklessly.
 
The crash of the housing/mortgage industry was caused by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which is govt. money invested into private enterprise, wherein all the profits go to the cronies of powerful govt. people, but the risks and losses go to the taxpayers. # #
 
post submitted by
R. C. “Dick” Moore

If you don’t go forward, you’re not going to go anywhere

May 20th, 2011 2 comments

Marty, thanks for your writing.  You are going where no one wants to go, but should.

I (the bank) have been a manufactured housing lender since 1991.  Not a large one, but neither is the bank I work for (Oxford Bank).  I rarely participate or respond to anyone or anything via the internet; however, Marty Lavin’s commentary interested me.  [See The Train To Oblivion, May 16th.]

Mr. Lavin has identified the brutal facts, but not how to fix them.  Further yet, does anybody really want to fix them?  Everybody  seems to have beaten up and worn down.

I have outlived the Greentrees, Consecos and others that felt booking loans at high rates, extended terms, big fees and huge  volumes was the thing to do.

I am still lending but, only to parks that want to “partner” with us.  Everyone hates bankers right now; hopefully, what I have to say doesn’t make it worse.

Below are a few comments and a few things I have learned in my 20+ years of MH lending.  I am probably getting off the path somewhat, but Marty opened the door for some comments from the lenders side:

  • Rates, of course, are higher than an auto loan.  When you loan money for 20 years at a fixed rate for anything, the bank must protect itself for future increases.
  • Anyone who thinks that the bank makes a huge spread on these loans is just plain ignorant.
  • The park owners control the bank’s destiny, losses and expenses.
    Today’s rates are controlled by losses and expenses, not just cost of funds.
  • Bank regulators do not like MH loans or “Trailers” as they say.
  • A manufactured home is considered personal property and sometimes it’s considered real estate.  If someone wants to hang you – it’s real estate.
  • I believe the parks that do their own financing are building a monster.  Let’s hope they retain a large reserve for losses, understand fair housing and Federal and State compliance laws.  I think they should let the bank be the bank.
    Servicing is expensive; it just increased again with the escrow law.
  • Generally, most parks will sell their own inventory over the bank’s repos, even if the bank pays for advertising.  They will switch the buyer to their home.
  • A big part of the banks’ losses are the parks’ profits.
  • Greentree and some other mega lenders were foolish; high rates and big loan fees do not make good loans.  Worse yet, they would finance the fees.
  • It’s the park’s customer until it becomes a repo; then it becomes the bank’s customer.
  • Some parks must feel that the bank guarantees the lot rent since it financed the home.
  • Many park owners are not active enough in their parks and put an underpaid and inexperienced employee in the park manager’s seat.
  • Unfortunately, these things don’t have motors.  Lenders are totally reliant on the parks for help.  With values in the tank, it’s hard to justify moving them.
  • There are still some crooks in this industry: fake down payments, home options that are not really there and straw purchases are still around.
  • The FDIC deems anyone with a credit score of 660 and under a subprime borrower.  This gives the appearance that my portfolio is subprime.
  • Manufactured home loan brokers are very dangerous.

The industry needs to go forward, not backwards.

Find a lender and “partner” with him or her.  Help the bank when they have a repo by assisting them in controlling the loss.  The
bank is paying the park a commission to sell the home; maybe they could even mow the yard for free?  Maybe they could use their maintenance guy to perform cosmetic repairs at cost?  In return, they could benefit from offering financing at reasonable rates and quality delivery.  This isn’t hard stuff.

My bank is still in the business of financing homes, but only for a handful of parks.  These are the parks that have “partnered” with us to get the job done.  Both the parks and the bank are much better off.

My biggest problems at present stem from loans made years ago in park(s) that have been sold to a REIT, portfolio operator or out-of-state investor.  The buyers of these parks figured out that they overpaid and are now increasing lot rents to compensate for their mistake.  This is creating unnecessary repos and they could care less.  # #

Al Cole
Oxford-Bank.com
alcole@oxford-bank.com