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Posts Tagged ‘LLCs’

Rent Control in MHCs

September 4th, 2013 1 comment

Tony,

The phone rang one morning and a young man returned my call to him, we'd been playing phone tag. I had left a message with his wife in Oregon earlier, and he was calling about two Vermont MH communities I have listed for sale. From the voice of each, I guessed they were both far younger than I.

Speaking with him, as I answered his questions, it was obvious this was not his first call on LLCs for sale. In a knowledgeable way he wound thru the obvious questions, finally asking whether Vermont LLCs are rent controlled. Yes, I explained, they are. I went on to explain Vermont allows CPI, about 3% annually presently, without concern, and a big one, allows provable capital improvements in addition, annually. I told him that as a former VT LLC owner I had found the scheme fully workable, as do many of my contemporaries.

The next day I got an email message saying he and his partner/wife had decided not to invest in any locale where rent control is in force. OK, I get it, but that removes quite a swath of locales, many which are hot purchase markets. This philosophy allows investment in say Mississippi or Alabama, but negates purchases in Florida or much of California. Oh…

After that, my mind wondered over my experiences of the dangers of rent control and lack of it. Yes, I said the danger of the lack of it. I actually was pretty young once, had hundreds of apartments and almost 2000 MH/RV sites. With the exception of a Florida LLC, I was in no jurisdiction where rent control was in effect. And when rent control was threatened in a jurisdiction, I was the first to the battlements opposing its imposition. I was and am a capitalist, and rent control seemed an anathema to my beliefs. I'm not alone, right?

But time went by, slowly the days passed, and some of my beliefs at 40 years of age made transition to a more measured understanding as I aged and acquired experience I previously lacked. Let me be frank, I was an accomplished and notorious rent increaser, which in my twilight years brings me no acclaim by others, and more importantly, myself.

What I found was that in apartments, and we're not speaking of New York City here, the market rents in an area kinda act as rent control. You find yourself as the top dog in rent rate for your 1000 sq. ft three bedroom apartment in your area. What you are very likely to find, as I did, your apartment rents last and less, staying empty longer than it should. Recovering the lost time and money brings you back to Earth and unless your calqy is busted, your late debt payments slap Hai Karate hard. I found apartments very self correcting as to rents.

Now, on to LLCs. We all know the reasons we invest in communities; they own the dwelling unit, they can't move the house, etc. All good stuff, of course. So as I bought LLCs from original owner/developers, I found that as longtime owners they had allowed their rents to slip behind the market, keeping their management easy, with many long term residents.

Of course, the purchase price always reflected the oft unspoken premium of raising rents to market. "Hell, they can pay a lot more than that!" So I paid more than cash flow to get the community, not real unusual, right? Then the rent increases started. Often stiff and early increases happened shortly after closing.

The first few increases were swallowed, albeit with plenty of bitching by residents. We raised rents as much in two-three years as the former owner did in 10 years. Note that in some instances the increased rent still didn't pay for the capitalized investment costs. I knew that, they only knew and cared their rent had doubled in short order. No esoteric explanations of cap rates and other MH investor jargon seemed particularly persuasive to the LLC residents.

Who was it, Newton, who theorized every action has an equal and opposite reaction? I raised rents, they moved out. And I acquired a reputation in that community as a rapacious rent increaser. And these reputations are hard to escape. I wouldn't really care that much except the reputation had a very bad impact on homesite rentals. That, I did care about.

At first I did the calculation I see many others doing. Yah, I had 100 homes at $100 per month, and even though I'm quickly down to 90 homes at $111 per month, hey, I'm getting the same money with less work and expenses. And it keeps going this way as rents increase, residents fleeing like a torrent, out the MH Paradise Estates gates, which has turned into Hell Bent Acres.  And as vacancies mount, you lose control of the community, no longer able to count on the desire to live in your LLC to keep people in line. And that desire includes pricing.

Were I the only one to have followed the raise-rents protocols, then only I would have suffered the residue, but of course, such was not the case. The MH industry's then flawed model, subsidized for years by flawed lenders, finally collapsed, dropping from 373,000 shipments in 1998, then tantalizing us into believing the hurricane-inspired 135,000 shipments of the mid 2000s was the stopping point, to the grim reality of 50,000 homes in the 2010s. Yah, I hear 60,000 homes could happen any day now.

I sat in on some very contentious MHI committees in the late 2000s era trying to formulate a chattel long term lease the GSEs could swallow. In concert with this I reviewed many LLC profiles showing monthly rent and occupancy. It probably won't surprise you that the vacancy was truly scary, yet rents occurred steeply and frequently.  I had already tried that, and even with the generous retail financing by GreenTree, CIT, The Associates, Security Pacific, Chase and their ilk, it didn't work. Now we were dealing with the GSEs, who I did not find stupid, and we were trying to equate rents in LLCs to the capitalized valuation of single family conventional real estate lots. Any thought of sharply limiting rent increases to gain long term and low rate financing being the trade-off, got serious push back. Such was not to be and by then as the effort lost all bouyancy, the GSEs woke up to far bigger challenges.

As a post script I am the very first to admit that some major figures in that committee have since come far closer to the rent restraints advocated in the long term lease effort as their stated belief for industry resuscitation.  Will that be enough? I greatly doubt it, but I sure think it is an indisputable industry wide measure in the road back to something other than Warren Buffett's table scraps.

So to my young friend in Oregon, rent control, other then confiscatory NYC apartments or some California cities in MH, can be a useful LLC owner restraint, quieting some of the early animal spirits we can all exhibit before experience shackles us. Did I like going to the rent hearings in my community in Florida and taking phallus down the throat to the gag control center? Oh, I loved it.

Still, Florida LLCs are and have long been highly prized acquisitions, not greatly injured by the relatively manageable process for raising rents.  With the relatively benign rent control such as in Florida and Vermont, you and the industry are actually protected from many of the practices employed in the industry, leading to so much push back against us.

Before you believe I'm asking you to petition your jurisdiction for rent control, let me disabuse of that notion. Nothing could be further from the truth. I rail against governmental intrusion in to my affairs daily. Everyday the beast grows larger, only a financial collapse likely to abort its growth. The only point I am making is that one must practice rental increase restraint on your own. Sometimes laws can help a process.

The flip side is that lack of restraint causes lack of residents at a time LLC vacancy nationwide forebodes another step down in industry size. In places like Vermont and Florida and others, rent control, which one should practice on their own, is instilled by statute. Perhaps not the best solution, but the record says the world did not end there.

Yes, we tell a great story which seemingly has legs of truth about our affordable housing heritage. But for whatever reason, even though its great dog food, the dogs won't eat it. Perhaps a legacy of rapacious rent increases, closing parks, high default rates and high home value depreciation could be a good place to start the industry resurgence. We build great homes, but my friends, that, by itself is not enough. ##

marty-lavin-posted-on-mhpronews(MARTIN V. LAVIN
attorney, consultant & expert witness
350 Main Street Suite 100
BURLINGTON, VERMONT 05401-3413

802-660-8888 off / 802-238-7777 cell
marty@martylavin.com

(Editor's note: The hot link was added by us, not Marty, nor was the link requested in any way by Marty. We think it is good for others to realize that while Marty is 'retired,' he is still involved in this industry and clearly cares about manufactured housing deeply. That is why he sounds off on issues, because he cares enough to raise them for discussion, thought and action.

As always, letters and articles by you or your colleagues that may agree or take other perspectives are encouraged. Send them to latonyk@gmail.com with Industry Voices Guest Column in the subject line. )

Again, Train to Oblivion, redux.

May 23rd, 2011 2 comments

Responses

After writing “The Train to Oblivion” for MHMSM.com, I fully expected to hear from its readers. I knew some would take the opportunity to essentially agree with what I had written, though often doing so anonymously. Not good to be known with too strong an opinion.

After writing about 30 major pieces for the late, greatly-lamented-that-it’s-gone Manufactured Home Merchandiser, and nine years in the 2000s of writing monthly newsletters, I also knew I would hear from others who would object to my comments. There is a substantial contingent of folks in the industry who view their role as cheerleaders, rather than analysts. Anything which smacks of industry criticism or is less than championing the industry, is painted as “mistaken”, if not downright traitorous. These folks can react quickly and strongly, particularly when it sours their personal stew.

I sat my fat azz in law school for three years, graduating with high honors. I was twice accepted after law school for the PHD program at Harvard Law School, an opportunity which lost out to having our first child. The minimum it says about me is that I paid attention to what was being taught, which was to analyze situations, determine what was important from that which was merely noise, and then decide a course of action based on that analysis.

Start Point

The “Oblivion” piece was a first step to setting up where the start point is at present for manufactured housing. Just as your need to know the “point of beginning” to give you directions to your destination, so we need to know the same. “Oblivion” set the start point, but is not, nor was it meant to be an all-encompassing white paper as to cause, effect and cure of the industry downturn. We’ll get to that.

The tenor of the piece is that from 1998 when 372,800 new HUDCode homes were shipped, until the present, as we “roll” along at 40,000 homes for 2011, something has gone grievously wrong. “Oblivion” sets the primary basis for that downfall as extremely flawed retail, chattel purchase money mortgages and the horrific loses associated with that, particularly in land lease communities. Truthfully, it just seems difficult to argue with that basic premise of “Oblivion,” whether you like it or not. Ask any lender.

Criticism

The two salient critiques I got after publication were 1) there are some people doing well in the industry; and 2) I haven’t come up with any solutions. Let’s deal with each of these individually starting with “hey Marty, some are doing well!” I want everyone to do well, the more the better. But, the reduction in home shipments from 1998 to the present speaks not of success, but of disastrous failure. There is no other way to say it, is there? If that offends cheerleaders, so be it.

It is as if I were to write a piece on the present status of the buggy whip industry since 1890 and someone tells me they Googled “buggy whip” and there are a couple of companies out there still thriving. (True.) That begs the question of where the 100 million+ horses running around in this nation in 1890 have gone and the incredible downsizing of that industry catering to the horse as a primary means of personal travel. A couple of success stories on buggy whips presently are akin to several “I know people doing well” remarks posted to my piece. Missing in the replies were where over 10,000 retailers have gone since 1998, the loss of the vast majority of lenders, loss of many LLCs, home builders, suppliers and every other stripe in the 1989-2005 MH industry, a process which actually has yet to stabilize. We are and will be still “losing them.” And some are doing well? Well, bless me.

Surely it makes some feel good to talk about the advantages of “affordable housing,” buy here-pay here, LLCs as rental MH apartments, and the need to observe renewed attention to our sales efforts. All great stuff of course, but my piece is meant to trace the past and probable course of industry trajectory. In spite of many people said to be doing well, scant attention is paid to the 90% of the industry already gone and that the probable trend is for more. Hiding behind “some are really doing well, Marty,” seems to me to be myopic in the extreme, and non-responsive to the matter. Correction of a deficiency begins with the realization one exists. That is obvious, to me, though I’m open to new information about “the industry,” not a few patches of good remaining activity. Please start with an explanation of how a decrease of 330,000 home shipments is “doing well,” and how we can start an upward trajectory again. None of the measures enumerated have had any positive impact in that regard, yet. I live in hope, with great skepticism.

Solutions

The second critique is that I appear to have no solutions, only pointing out problems. Interesting. My mentors never allowed that of me, or I of my people. It’s bad form. On my web site, as an example (martylavin.com), you’ll find an article entitled, “Hometown Banks 101: Where the money is.” The Banker who wrote in response to “Oblivion” talks about industry participants partnering with a bank. What a novel thought, and how interesting to suggest I haven’t spoken to that. Not only did I write an article on the subject for the July 2003 MHMerch, but I gave two annual back-to-back seminars at the Vegas show in the mid to latter 2000’s, both of which had over 125 participants and were the best attended of all seminars both years. I led the attendees thru exactly what is needed to be done to partner with a bank, including the following: “The first ingredient in this recipe for building a successful relationship with your banker is probably the most essential; you must protect the bank–the valued source of your funding–at all times by helping with difficult things.” I go on to enumerate the needed activities. See the article on my web site. I was there on this subject by 1972, protecting our bank, Guaranty Bank and Trust Company of Worchester, Mass, as we disposed of over 200 repos in the Carolinas, during that frightful 1974-1976 downturn. Our reward? A bank that stayed with us for years after, backing us up and down the East Coast. Yah, I think I got that one down awhile back.

Others have suggested I carp about the deficiencies of chattel lending, but have given no guidance on how to fix it. In a number of my newsletters I wrote copiously on exactly the needed solutions to correct the industry chattel lending model which had melted down, and in December 2007 I wrote the piece, “Saving Chattel Lending,” just one more in a long line of similar efforts. This one is full of possible solutions. Instead of being criticized for not offering solutions, it would be better to state I have spoken too much on the subject, with very few listening, frankly. This article also appeared in the MHMerchandiser. I’ve spoken with MHMSM.com’s publisher Tony Kovach and we have agreed to do an updated version of that article for his June issue on this web site, so please watch for it to be published in about 10 days.

The Whole

Again, the gist is not that specific opportunities do not exist in the industry, they do. My piece speaks to the industry as a whole industry, not as to specific opportunities therein. All of us have reasons to put a best light on our own endeavors. My pieces can be influential, with important people. I can inadvertently hurt a person’s or company’s enterprise by my remarks. That is why many would rather I keep it to myself, and I often do pull my punches.

People will react to that. One alludes that I’ve lost track of LLCs as I no longer have any. I still have an LLC, WITHOUT any debt. But even if I had none, I would look to a projected 40,000 2011 annual home shipments with not more than 10,000 going into LLCs today and the frequent emails I get from repo specialists for troubled LLCs, almost daily. And I would further look to rent-to-destroy, buy here-default here, and my favorite, LLC apartments. Does this all mean nothing? Are these good trends? Is this what will save a good industry, or even individual situations, or are these merely holding actions? Does one need to jump off a roof to know it will hurt? Did the 20 years of owning 1,600 LLC home sites by myself teach me nothing? I guess so.

One of my respondents just penned a piece on his blog on the rate and cost difference between buying MH and site built housing. Wow! How timely. I sent him a detailed example of the matter at least a year ago, but more importantly, wrote a piece on the matter in the MHMerch in January 2001. “Differentials.” Guess I was behind the curve on that one, eh? But hell, the fact one can buy a $122,000 site built for the same costs as a $65,000 MH shouldn’t be a problem, should it? How do you fix that one? I’m not sure my solutions extend to that.

Campaign

The image campaign rhetoric heating up again? In Oct ’08 I wrote a major article on this for the MHMerch exploring the reasons why it was needed. “The Industry Campaign: needed or extravagance?” I came down squarely on the absolute need. The industry passed on my suggestions. We traded the dollars saved on the image campaign for a minus 80,000 annual home shipments from the time of my article to the present. Now, . . . that IS penny wise and pound foolish. I also railed endlessly about it in my newsletters. Even I got tired of hearing it.

Just as the stock market should be viewed in light of the attractiveness of some individual stocks, not as a whole stock market, so I understand some folks are doing well, or at least surviving, but I stand by the statements I made in the piece. Seems some of the folks do not really believe in Marty’s prime dictum, though. For those who forgot: Forget what people are saying, watch what is happening. And what people are saying is things aren’t that bad cause some are doing well. What is happening is we’ve lost 90% of our industry. Please do not bore me with individual tales of success made by respondents to my article, who were either incapable of critical thought, or unable to speak the truth about the TOTAL and general industry condition, and which is the subject of “Oblivion.”

Old Friend

I lost my old friend, Dan Mendl last week, as he did not quite reach 81 years. Thinking back, I well remember his asking me where the people in business over 60 years of age were. We wandered in and out of appointments at a high clip in the late 1980’s and the 90’s, and at his 60+ years of age, we rarely met another older than Dan. Now that I’ve settled into 68 years, I’m beginning to understand. It gets wearing to hear the same solutions I heard in the 70’s, then the 1980’s, carrying into the 1990’s, sliding into most of the early 2000’s, but most not adopted, or even tried. Nothing changes in spite of the blather. You just tire of the same crapiola, presented as though it’s new. The one thing lenders knew how to do, and it has saved the few remainders: tighten up like crazy on chattel lending guidelines.

The Best

But I’ve saved the best for last. Here is one I’ve never heard before. (I lied!) This is novel, and is the best of all the comments posted. “Where’s the industry headed? Right where financing leads us.” So far, so good, I am in complete agreement. Then he continues, “and I think that will involve a contrarian lender dusting off a business model that worked pretty well 30 years ago financing MH’s in LLC’s.”

Amazing. I was around 30 years ago, in 1981. By that time I had been in Trailerville 9 years. Since 1972 to now, my own companies have transacted over $1 billion of MH chattel paper, primarily in LLCs. Through repeated head blows I finally came to understand that the above business model does not “work pretty well” for the lender. It might have been good for the community owners, and/or the factory, and perhaps even the homeowner. For the lender, the word “disaster” generally describes the results for 99.90% of all lenders using the business model of 30 years ago. Where is this notion coming from that the model then in existence for MH lenders worked well? Nothing could be further from the truth.

Don’t believe me? Ask Paul Nichols of Vanderbilt Mortgage, or Tim Williams and Rich Ray at 21st Mortgage, or Don Glisson at Triad Financial or Abdul Rajput at USBank, or John Harcher at SACU how that lending model of 30 years ago worked. They were all there, and I could name dozens more. Incredible that people should still believe that statement!

Repos

Oh, and repo costs in land/home deals? Yeah, I’m not really up on that one, either. The fact I spent 8 years as FannieMae’s full time manufactured housing consultant all through the 2000’s as their land/home and modular portfolio rapidly grew, crashed, was fixed and then worked relatively well didn’t prepare me for the kind of problems my correspondent detailed. It all was news to me after working on a multi-billion dollar portfolio of those type loans. Who’d a guessed?

Bromides

Now a whole new group of people are once again proposing many of the same old bromides to highly intractable problems. The greatest fear is not that we may not have possible solutions to our ills, but that even if we screw up the courage to try them, they may not be enough. There is a reason this is all happening, and it has nothing to do with the Aztec calendar.  Forget the cheerleading, analyze industry conditions with an eye for change or we can let it all go wherever it’s meant to go, on its own. And we know it has a running start on that course.  The good news being that even with 1000 annual home shipments, someone may still be doing well. I’m not sure the industry will be prospering, though. # #

 

MARTIN V. (MARTY) LAVIN
attorney, consultant, expert witness
practice only in factory built housing
350 Main Street Suite 100
Burlington, Vermont 05401-3413
802-660-9911 802-238-7777 cell
web site: www.martylavin.com
email mhlmvl@aol.com

Editor’s Note: We have again honored the author’s request to post his article “as is.”

The Train To Oblivion

May 16th, 2011 17 comments

The MH train comes off the tracks.

It took me a while in the early 2000s to recognize a sea change had occurred in MH chattel lending.  Always chattel lending had been a loser for virtually every lender involved in it.  But it had powered the MH industry to 20% of all new housing starts, being responsible for up to 80% of all purchase money MH loans up to about 2000.

What always put new lenders coming into the industry to sleep is that with a growing loan portfolio size, the first 3-4 years of loan growth mask the true loan performance of the portfolio for the entering chattel lender.  But once the portfolio size stabilizes, one can gauge the true portfolio performance going forward. It will show very poor performance.  The lender will usually panic, not knowing what to do.  The smart ones, not too many of those, will shut down the program right then and take their losses.  Most others will muddle on as the employees try to keep their jobs by assuring their bosses that they can handle it.  They never can.  The program will ultimately collapse as things get even worse.  “Take your losses now or take bigger ones later.”  Some choice.

Before year 2000, the process went through repeated cycles of this start-hold-collapse for chattel lending by innumerable lenders, starting in the ’50’s.  Always new lenders came lured by the “high rates” available in chattel lending.  Few seemed to recognize how difficult it was too succeed in MH chattel lending.  None wanted to recognize that it didn’t matter how high interest rates were, only how much of them you kept in the end.  All believed they were smarter than the previous failed lenders, and would do a better job than those before them who had failed.  Few did.  (Boy, did I tire of hearing that crapiola!)

But in the early 1990’s  Wall Street money came to chattel lending.  Those were happy days!  Money grew on every Tree, especially Green ones.  A bevy of retail lenders came from 1991 on, all of whom were going to out-GreenTree GreenTree, the industry giant.  All these lenders got easy access to “Wall Street” money, at least for a awhile.  The infamous Asset Backed Securities provided liquidity for loans as seldom before seen in chattel lending.  Since nothing had changed from the underlying difficulty of surviving chattel lending, few, if any, survived this bout as the industry peaked at 372,800 new home shipments in 1998, and started a descent which has yet to end.

It took me awhile to recognize this sea change in chattel lending.  Few of us foresaw the true depth of the problem.  But by 2001-02 I could see that this time it was different.  Always in the past new lenders had come to subsidize the industry with the losses they took with unsurvivable chattel lending.  In the past 50 years these horrific lender losses had allowed HUDCode factories to flourish, retailers to become millionaires and land lease community owners to keep parks full, even as many shamelessly raised rents.  Again, this was all subsidized by terminally flawed chattel lending.  It went unrecognized.

But worse, the Wall Street boys do not like taking losses up the butt and started to dissect the reality of MH chattel loan performance.  What they found was chilling.  Losses for the best paper in LLCs were in the 30-35% lifetime range.  In the scratch-and-dent category, losses sometimes exceeded 100%. But worse, now that they knew, they blabbed the information to the world.  Several Wall Street firms tracked MH chattel loan portfolios closely and put out monthly reports of the carnage.  This differed from the past, when lenders, mostly banks, S&Ls and credit companies took their losses and seemed too embarrassed to tell the whole world of their travails.  After all, just a year before they were widely touting how great the chattel MH portfolio was performing and the great contribution they were making to “affordable housing”.  That would change soon enough.  Little did they know then how great their “contribution” was to be.

Here is an interesting sidelight:  I’ve identified above the recipients of the lender’s losses.  Note I did not include the borrower.  Yes, they got into a home they should not been able to buy, but they hardly ever got to keep the home.  Either they couldn’t afford it, or when they tried to resell it, they were unable to, for a variety of reasons.  This brought divorces, loss of home, children changing schools and all the other personal tragedy the loss of a home brings.  Few apologies here by the industry.  “We gave them a chance at home ownership was the industry refrain.”  Swell.

By the time GreenTree/Conseco collapsed around 2001-2003, the MH chattel world had changed.  Forever.  Most did not recognized it.  It was said to be just a periodic pullback.  The industry would return, they said, it always had.  Lenders had lost their nerve.  We could get the GSEs to bail us out.  We could get “Duty to Serve.”  If they won’t do it, then Title I will.  To this day we have Pollyanna’s carping this drivel.  “Its simply a matter of better sales training.  Now subprime is done, it will allow MH to return.  (Forget MH chattel lending is the King of Subprime.)  We are the only provider of non-subsidized affordable housing.  Its simply a matter to fix HUD Subpart I.”  In the face of a 90% reduction in volume, can it be that these thoughts still drive an industry?  It seems unimaginable.  (New to MH and the Subchapter I quest?  It is a part of The Manufactured Housing Improvement Act of 2000 dealing with recalls, home installation and handling consumer complaints on MH.  Like Don Quixote, the industry DC operatives, live to believe that only these DC quests are important.)

Around 2005-2006 the industry still had enough muscle to have faced that we were operating from a Failed Industry Model.  The Roper Survey told us that.  All of the reasoning above would not save us.  Only an acceptance that drastic measures were needed could have changed it for us.  Since we refused to act, “The Market” did it for us.  It punished tone-deaf MH business behavior with ruthless abandoned, and is still doing it.  The industry still doesn’t listen, though one wanders whether trying to really do something about it would have any impact at this point.  Frankly, I doubt it.  The high home value depreciation and high loan losses at increased loan volume seem impenetrable.  We have failed to move against this, even if it is possible to do so, which is daunting at best.

With Dodd-Frank and SAFE in place, and other regulatory devices sure to come, the impediments to an easy, even a difficult industry response are many.  n the face of this we are still worried about Subpart I?  Were we to get everything we wanted there, how many more homes would we sell? Heaven help us that this is the response of a terminal ill industry by its leaders.

As with all struggling businesses, the industry has scurried to try to make up for the existing industry model deficiencies.  Don’t have Greenseco-type chattel lending available?  Heck, start some buy here-pay here and create your own.  Want to keep rents coming in?  Buy homes and rent them out.  Many came to MH to escape the apartment business, but are now doing a version of apartments far worse than real apartments.  Overlook the regulatory constraints, the illiquidity of self-lending loans, roll up your selves and go to WORK, boys and girls.  Hey, it worked in the past going back to the 1950s.  Oh, really, and how did they handle Dodd-Frank then, did you say?  Or SAFE?  Oh..

Its a changed world and having lost our own lending business here we’ve transacted since 1972, we are impacted as are most others.  We are not and will not be alone, as the industry gets closer to 40,000 shipments than to 50,000.  At those numbers, I can only assume a whole new tier of businesses are endangered, as most of us scramble to avoid facing the prime business dictum:  Get out of a dead business.  This is bolstered by my own Prime Dictum:  “Never mind what people are saying, watch what is happening”.  And what is happening is an open book.  All can, or should be able to read it.

I suppose those folks who went to those long-ago industry speeches I gave, rolled their eyes then as I correctly prophesied the point where we now are, can point to their own acumen.  Come on Marty, it can’t get that bad they said!  Sitting there now with 50% LLC vacancies and unsalable self-financed loan portfolios as their response, they can take solace in their prescient course of action.  Of course.  Frankly, I would much prefer to have been wrong, very wrong.

So what does this all mean?  I hate to say it because I’ve tried to remain in the same industry as you have, but my industry left me.  Has it left you?  What is the next stop on this train to oblivion?  # #

MARTIN V. (MARTY) LAVIN
attorney, consultant, expert witness
practice only in factory built housing
350 Main Street Suite 100
Burlington, Vermont 05401-3413
802-660-9911, 802-238-7777 cell
web site: www.martylavin.com
email mhlmvl@aol.com

Editor’s Note:  We have honored the author’s request to post his article “as is.”  As with all our Industry Voices Guest articles, we invite reader response and dialogue, either public (by posting a Discus response below) or private (phone or email).  Thanks for reading and getting involved!